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Abstract
“Shock” is perhaps the central concept of modernist aesthetics
and Walter Benjamin its best known theorist.  It has been well
documented that Benjamin’s long-lasting friendship with
Bertolt Brecht and the latter’s dramatic theory had a profound
influence on his thinking about this notion.  Brecht's
techniques of interruption and juxtaposition in the practice of
epic theater were in close relationship with Benjamin’s use of
montage as a mechanism to “liberate” meaning.  Despite
Theodor Adorno’s and Gershom Scholem’s attempt to situate
Benjamin’s thought in a different aesthetic tradition, Brecht’s
understanding of Verfremdung (estrangement) and Benjamin’s
idea of “shock” are often deemed identical.  In this paper I
compare both concepts, looking at their points of coincidence
and tension. I also relate their development to one of the
most telling friendships in the history of twentieth-century
philosophy.
Key Words
Baudelaire, Benjamin, Brecht, Erfahrung/Erlebnis (experience),
ostranenie (making strange), Verfremdung (estrangement),
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1. Encounter                                                                 
“Madam, may I help you?”  “Please,” she said.  “Their name is
manderola,” the gentleman replied.  The woman had been
trying to buy some almonds but could not guess their name in
Italian.  Having made her purchase, she walked toward the
piazza.  He followed her and asked:  “May I accompany you
and carry your package?  Allow me to introduce myself: Doctor
Walter Benjamin.”  It was the summer of 1924, in Capri.  This
first encounter of Benjamin with Asya Lacis, the Latvian leader
of Soviet experimental children’s theater, was the beginning of
more than one friendship.[1]  Benjamin fell in love with her.
 This drove him to the Soviet Union where he became
acquainted with the Russian avant-garde.  It was also Lacis
who introduced Benjamin to Bertolt Brecht in 1929.
The relationship between Benjamin and Brecht was one of
those intellectual friendships that inspire the imagination.
There was a great deal of poetry and fine sentiment in the
way they treated each other.  They were bound by the
common fate of having to escape from Nazi Germany.  From
his exile in Skovsbostrand, Denmark, the playwright invited
Benjamin to join him.  The critic refused, as he refused to go
to Jerusalem, with Gershom Scholem, and to New York, with
Theodor W. Adorno and the other members of the Institute for
Social Research.  However, he paid long visits to his friend and
kept corresponding with him.  Benjamin described his stays in
the green oasis where Brecht lived as “tantamount to monastic
confinement.”[2]  There was never extended conversation
between the two men.  They played chess in silence and
worked on their own writing for long hours.  When they
engaged in discussion, they talked about the classics,
Nazism,and their own literary production. 
It is difficult discuss the intellectual projects of Brecht and
Benjamin, and the mutual influences between these thinkers,
without taking into account this panorama of friendship and
exile.  Yet the relationship between these men, as thinkers, is
much more complex than their friendship.  It is clear that the
playwright became one of the most important influences on
Benjamin’s thinking about modernist art.  Indeed, Benjamin
gave an unreserved endorsement to Brecht’s epic theater.
 Nevertheless, he remained distant from Brechtean aesthetic
utilitarianism. The points of coincidence and tension between
the two thinkers are revealed as we analyze their use of
certain key concepts in modernist aesthetics.   In this essay I
will attempt to uncover some of these tensions (while avoiding
to rigidify them or superficially resolve their ambiguity), by
looking at how Benjamin’s idea of “shock” compares with the
Brechtean notion of Verfremdung (estrangement).[3]
2. Exile and friendship
In a letter to Scholem dated June 29, 1929, Benjamin
described Brecht as a “noteworthy acquaintance ... about
whom and about which there is much to be said.”  Some
weeks later he wrote:
You will be interested to hear that very friendly
relations have recently developed between Brecht
and myself, based less on what he has done, of
which I only know the Threepenny Opera and the
ballads, than on his present plans, in which one
cannot but be interested.[4]
These “present plans” refer to Brecht’s experimentation with
Lehrstücke, “teaching plays,” which he presented in a series of
publications called Versuche (Essays).  According to Rainer
Nägele, “Benjamin took a passionate interest in these essays,
finding in them an affinity with a side of his work that he could
share neither with Scholem nor Adorno.”[5]
Soon after they met, Brecht and Benjamin became intensive
collaborators.  Benjamin recalls holding long conversations
with the playwright about the crisis of cultural critique and the
need to restore its basic function:  “to teach interventionist
thinking.”[6]  The conviction of both thinkers that criticism
ought to be understood as a continuation of politics led them
to plan a periodical in 1930 that, had it existed, would have
been called Krisis und Kritik (Crisis and Critique).  Due to
financial difficulties and disagreements between the editors,
the project was never realized.  Yet, the surviving notes of the
conversations of the two thinkers in planning the journal
reveal differences in their thinking that would last until
Benjamin’s death.  For Brecht, the critical function of thinking
was associated with dialectical materialism only.  Benjamin, in
contrast, spoke of movements in earlier times “primarily
religious, which, like Marx, instigated a radical destruction of
society’s icons.”[7]
Throughout the 1930s, Benjamin published a series of writings
and commentaries on Brecht.  The first one of these begins:
Brecht is a difficult phenomenon.  He refuses to
make “free” use of his great literary gifts.  And
there is not one of the gibes against his style of
literary activity – plagiarist, trouble-maker,
saboteur – that he would not claim as a
compliment to his un-literary, anonymous, and
yet noticeable activity as educator, thinker,
organizer, politician, and theatrical producer.  In
any case he is unquestionably the only writer
writing in Germany today who asks himself where
he ought to apply his talent, who applies it only
where he is convinced of the need to do so, and
who abstains on every other occasion.[8]
Benjamin’s reflections on Brecht were always written in this
tone of adulation and empathy.  He admired Brecht’s
determination, clarity of mind, and firm commitment to revolt
against bourgeois conformism.  Brecht, however, never
stopped being a “difficult phenomenon” since, on the one
hand, Benjamin did not think in Brechtean instrumentalist
terms, and on the other, Brecht often harshly criticized
Benjamin’s messianic ideas.  Moreover, the intellectual
sympathy between the playwright and the critic aroused much
anxiety among Benjamin’s other friends.  Adorno, Scholem,
and Gretel Karplus (Adorno’s fiancée and later wife) all feared
Brecht’s influence on the critic.  Adorno called Brecht a “vulgar
Marxist” and Scholem described Benjamin’s approach to
Marxism as a form of self-deception.  
Benjamin responded to these recriminations, first, by
emphasizing his affinities with Brecht and, second, by
describing his own use of Marxism not as an ideology of fixed
ideas but as “a way of taking position in relation to the
changing situation.”[9]  He avoided being seen as a dogmatic
representative of dialectical materialism.  Rather, he projected
himself as “a researcher to whom the posture (Haltung) of the
materialist seems to be more fruitful, scientifically and
humanly,” than any other episteme.[10] Defending this
posture was, however, rather difficult for Benjamin.  In 1938,
he described himself as “a man at home between the jaws of a
crocodile, which he holds apart with iron struts.”[11]
One of the clearest examples of the tensions and ambiguities
that characterized the relationship between the critic and the
dramatist is a letter that Benjamin wrote to Karplus in
response to her own concerns regarding his closeness to
Brecht.  The letter reads:
In the economy of my existence, a few relations,
that can be counted, play indeed a role that allow
(sic) me to assert a pole that is opposite my
original being...these relations have always
provoked a more or less violent protest in those
closest to me....  I can do little more than ask my
friends to trust me ...those ties, whose dangers
are obvious, will reveal their fruitfulness ....  It is
not at all unclear to you that my life as well as
my thought moves (sic) in extreme
positions.[12] 
Soon after Brecht moved to Skovsbostrand in 1933, he invited
Benjamin to join him there.  Benjamin presumably declined
the invitation due to his fear of the aggressive winter, the
isolation that living in a Danish-speaking context would entail,
and the idea of becoming financially dependent on his friend.
 Yet he moved a great part of his library (which he had initially
left in Berlin) to Brecht’s house and visited the playwright in
1934, 1936, and 1938.  During these encounters the two men
listened to the news from Vienna on the radio, commented on
their writings, and talked about Virgil, Dante, and Goethe.
 Some of Benjamin’s notes allow us to reconstruct the
atmosphere of these exchanges.[13] It was often Brecht who
spoke and Benjamin who listened. Brecht defended his
positions with determination; Benjamin tried to leave open the
possibility for a more careful consideration of the arguments at
stake.  “The destructive aspect of Brecht’s character,” wrote
Benjamin, “puts everything in danger almost before it has
been achieved.”[14]
In general, the playwright and the critic lived differently.  One
was the man of the stage in search for concrete truths;[15]
the other was a “distracted individual” who “had placed a
secretive wall around his person.”[16]  Rather than setting
them apart, however, these differences aroused a certain
fascination for the other.  As Eugene Lunn indicates, Benjamin
found in Brecht a “most useful antidote to his own esoteric
hermeticism.”[17]  Jürgen Habermas suggests that, for
Benjamin, Brecht was a “kind of reality principle.”[18]Yet, in
spite the great influence that Brecht wielded over
Benjamin,[19] both men maintained their intellectual
independence.[20]
3. Visions of shock
Brecht is often considered the most radical theorist and
practitioner of twentieth-century theater.  “He was a
rebel.”[21]  He rebelled against a “theater of illusion” or what
he called “Aristotelian drama,” a theater that conjures up
before the audience an illusion of real events, drawing each
member of the public into the action “by causing him to
identify himself with the hero to the point of complete self-
oblivion.”[22]  When one looks at this public, wrote Brecht,
“one discovers more or less motionless bodies – they seem to
be contracting their muscles in a strong physical effort, or else
to have relaxed them after violent strain ...; they have their
eyes open but they do not look.”[23]  A theater of illusion
serves to purge the emotions of the audience, but leaves it
“uninstructed and unimproved.”  It converts the art of theater
into an article of consumption and destroys its potential of
becoming a laboratory of social change.  “The audience should
not be made to feel emotions; they should be made to think.
 But identification with the characters of the play makes
thinking almost impossible.”[24]
An insistence that the audience develop an entirely different,
nonconformist attitude is at the core of Brechtean theory. The
dramatist’s understanding of art was overtly political.  He saw
“apolitical” art as merely the label of the artistic expressions
that favored the interests of the ruling classes. Drawing
heavily from Cubism and the Russian avant-garde, he sought
to use art as a demythologizing tool that could negate the
commonplace and taken-for-granted and reveal social as well
as ideological contradictions.  His purpose, however, was not
“to produce the joys of satirical exposure” but to “develop a
modus operandi for radical social change.”[25]
“The modern theater is the epic theater,” wrote Brecht in
1930, placing his dramatic theory at the core of modernist
aesthetics. The term ‘epic’ remained attached to Brecht,
despite his own later attempts to refer to his work as
"dialectical” or “scientific.”  The label is not misleading; it
embraces the efforts of Brechtean drama to expose the
underling historicity of a specific social situation and inculcate
in the audience a detached, distancing attitude toward the
events portrayed.  But the promises of epic theater go beyond
a depiction of the world as it really is.  The audience is to be
profoundly transformed through the experience of such
performances.  Indeed, epic theater must plant the seeds of
social transformation.  In the mid-1930s, Brecht described this
dramatic practice as follows:
The stage began to be instructive....Oil, inflation,
war, social struggles, the family, religion, wheat,
the meat market, all became subjects for
theatrical representation....As the "background”
came to the front of the stage so people’s activity
was subject to criticism ....[t]he theater became
an affair for philosophers, but only for such
philosophers as wished (sic) not just to explain
the world but also to change it.[26] 
As this quotation suggests, Brecht attempted to dispel the
naturalist illusion of art as reflection.  While naturalistic theater
represses awareness to make the illusion of its authenticity
more vivid, epic theater aims at creating awareness by
exposing its own artifice.  The consciousness of being
performed on stage allows epic theater to experiment with the
different possibilities of reality and, ultimately, portray both
individuals and social reality as capable of being
“reassembled.”  Yet, these processes cannot occur away from
the audience.  “The epic play,” wrote Brecht, “is a construction
that must be viewed rationally and in which things must be
recognized; therefore, the way it is presented must go half-
way to meet such viewing.”[27] Hence, the narrative content
ought to be presented in a dialectical, non-illusionist, and non-
linear manner.  This was achieved through the use of the
Verfremdungseffekte.
In Brecht’s plays actors spoke as if they were reciting someone
else’s words; they went in and out of character on stage;
scenes formed a discontinuous montage, and were, at times,
frozen into a tableau vivant.  These mechanisms were directed
at stripping events of their self-evident, familiar qualities,
making them strange, and allowed the audience to observe
their underlying causes.  The process involved a moment of
shock or astonishment, through which the audience realized its
own previous state of unawareness.
According to Ernst Bloch, Brecht’s Verfremdungseffekte is
directed against the state of alienation that results from the
reification of social relations in advanced capitalist societies. As
individuals become alien to the environment and to other
beings, as their lives and work are reduced to the state of a
commodity, they loose their capacity to hear and see.
Therefore, in order for social change to occur, said Bloch,
these people had to be awakened.  The experience of
regaining perception is shocking, “but its effect within a
purposeful context will not be uninviting.”[28]
Estrangement evokes surprise ... and lets the
beholder contemplate experience separated, as in
a frame, or heightened, as on a pedestal .... This
leads increasingly away from the usual and
makes the beholder pause and take notice ....
Thus a faint aura of estrangement already
inheres in the kind of spoken inflection that will
suddenly make the hearer listen anew.[29]
In Bloch’s view, the destruction of stage illusion is not an end
in itself.  By inhibiting the process of identification between the
spectator and the character, familiar objects and situations
appear in a new light and therefore create a new
understanding of human relations.  A “distancing mirror”
allows the public to perceive the contradictions within “the
familiar.”[30]
The production of shock in Brecht ultimately results from the
abolition of the division between performance and audience.
This process fascinated Benjamin.  In the first version of “What
is Epic Theater” (1930-31) he described it as follows:
The point at issue in the theater today can be
more accurately defined in relation to the stage
than to the play.  It concerns the filling-in of the
orchestra pit.  The abyss which separates the
actors from the audience like the dead from the
living, the abyss whose silence heightens the
sublime in drama, whose resonance heightens the
intoxication of opera, this abyss which, of all the
elements of the stage, most indelibly bears the
traces of its sacral origins, has lost its function.
 The stage is still elevated, but it no longer rises
from an immeasurable depth; it has become a
public platform.[31]
Through this spatial description of epic theater, we can identify
strong similarities between the intellectual projects of
Benjamin and Brecht and make the transition toward the
analysis of Benjamin’s understanding of “shock.” Benjamin’s
notion of the politicization of art is based upon the idea of the
withering of the “aura,” that sacred halo that placed a distance
between the work of art and the spectator, regardless of how
close they were.  In his 1936 essay, “The Work of Art in the
Era of Mechanical Reproduction,” Benjamin analyzed the
effects, both political and perceptual, of the use of new
cultural technologies for the production and reproduction of
art.
The mechanical reproduction of a work of art by new aesthetic
practices, such as cinema and photography, dispels the
“auratic traces” left upon art from its successive functions as
part of religious worship and the Renaissance cult of beauty.
 The social bases of the demise of auratic art are, on the one
hand, “the desire of contemporary masses to bring things
‘closer’ spatially and humanly,” and on the other, “their bent
toward overcoming the uniqueness of every reality by
accepting its reproduction.”[32]
For Benjamin, the reproducibility of photos, prints, and films in
the era of high capitalism destabilizes the sense of uniqueness,
authenticity, and unapproachability of art.  In this process, art
leaves the realm of the religious to enter the world of politics:
The instant the criterion of authenticity ceases to
be applicable to artistic production the total
function of art is reversed. Instead of being based
on ritual, it begins to be based on another
practice – politics.[33]
The privileged example of these new technologically mediated
cultural forms is film.  Benjamin describes it as “the art form
that is in keeping with the increased threat to his life which
modern man has to face.”[34] Not only does it prepare the
modern man for the shocks of urban life through the constant
bombardment of moving images, but it also allows a
“deepening in apperception” by breaking down and enlarging
time, space, and movement.
Yet Benjamin also showed great enthusiasm for the
transformative political potential of epic theater to the point of
comparing it to film.[35]  “The forms of epic theater,” he
wrote, “correspond to the new technical forms – cinema and
radio.”[36]  With its emphasis on montage, interruption and,
most of all, in closing the distance between the audience and
the characters, epic theater was for him at the core of the
artistic revolution of the twentieth century:
The songs, the onstage captions, the gestic
conventions of the actors set each situation off
against the others.  This constantly creates
intervals which undermine the audience’s illusion;
these intervals are reserved for the audience’s
critical judgments.[37]
Aside from his intellectual interest in the critical potential of
modernist techniques of interruption, Benjamin incorporated
them in his own writing.  Quotations appear in his texts as a
means of disrupting their continuity and linearity.  He
introduced analogies in rapid succession (e.g., “allegories are
in the realm of thoughts, what ruins are in the realm of
things;”[38] “magician and surgeon compare to painter and
cameraman”[39]), and often strikes the reader by juxtaposing
ideas and presenting extremely short arguments.  His
aphoristic writing structures the text as a montage of citations
without overt correspondence among them.  This allows the
creation of multiple associations between written fragments
and leaves the text open for innovative, “liberating”
interpretations.[40]  In this sense, Benjamin’s writings
embody his view of history as an object of construction.
 Furthermore, as Richard Shiff suggests, “Benjamin’s writing
figures modernity in a language of analogy that acts upon the
reader in lieu of explaining.”[41]
“The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire” is the finest
example of Benjamin’s use of montage.  The essay, completed
in 1938, is structured as a collage of discrete images of social
experience that have been ripped out of their “natural”
context.  They provide elements from nineteenth century Paris
and more recent history, allowing Benjamin to construct a web
of constellations that resembles Baudelaire’s own writings.
 Reading the essay for the first time produces a sense of
dislocation and distress.  The effect is deliberate.[42]  In a
letter to Horkheimer written in 1938, Benjamin said:  “The
better the work is composed, the more it will be able to break
free from a superficial continuity.”[43]
However, Benjamin’s interest in fragments of experience and
archaic objects is not that of the antiquarian.  “He was
convinced,” writes Michael W. Jennings, “that the
reconstruction of the nineteenth century in a manner that
could expose its underlying structure might have an explosive
effect on the contemporary understanding of the historical
situation.”  He believed that “his reliance upon the
constellation as a principle of essay construction might lead
toward that underlying structure.”[44]  Thus, according to the
critic, narrative continuity doomed traditional history writing to
a tacit complicity with the ideology of the ruling class.
4. Shock and experience
Benjamin’s use of montage as a mechanism to “liberate”
meaning was influenced by Brechtean techniques of
interruption and juxtaposition.[45]  In both instances shock
appears as the primary experience of dislocation in modern life
and as an aesthetic practice to free art from the enslaving and
exploitative dynamics of commodity capitalism. For Benjamin,
as for Brecht, shock shatters perception, exposing the
discontinuity of history.  Does it also lead to the attainment of
class-consciousness and, ultimately, to revolution (as Brecht
would claim)?  In other words, do Benjamin and Brecht share
the same understanding of the political effects of aesthetic
shock?  These questions have multiple implications.  They
compel us to reflect upon how Benjamin described the
aesthetic techniques of epic theatre and compared them to his
own work.  They also demand that we differentiate the
Brechtean use of Verfremdung from the concept of ostranenie
(“making strange”) in the work of the Russian avant-garde.
 Furthermore, they entail a more extensive analysis of the role
shock plays in Benjamin’s thought.
In his writings on Brecht, Benjamin acclaimed the use of shock
in epic theater as a means of revolting against all subjectivist
artistic expressions and lay bare the illusory character of linear
accounts of history.  “It can happen this way, but it can also
happen quite a different way – that is the fundamental attitude
of one who writes for epic theater.”[46]  Indeed, Brecht’s use
of shock as a mechanism to “make the familiar estrange”
coincides with Benjamin’s project of “exploding things” from
their ordinary and habitual existence as commodified
“enslaved and enslaving objects.”[47]  Moreover, as Lunn
explains, a central feature of Benjamin’s method of “profane
illumination” was “defamiliarizing estrangement through
viewing objects up close but from many angles.”[48]
The literary critic, however, does not share with the playwright
the same understanding of the social consequences of shock.
 One way to explain this difference is to compare their
relationship to the work of the Russian writer and playwright
Sergei Tretyakov.  Both thinkers were profoundly influenced by
Tretyakov’s experiments with theatricality.  Benjamin,
however, remained closer to Tretyakov than Brecht in his
understanding of the effects of shock on the recipient of the
work of art.  As Andreas Huyssen explains:
Just as Tretyakov, in his futurist poetic strategy,
relied on shock to alter the psyche of the
recipient of art, Benjamin, too, saw shock as a
key to changing the mode of reception of art and
to disrupting the dismal and catastrophic
continuity of everyday life. In this respect ... both
differ from Brecht.[49]
Indeed, Brecht’s Verfremdungseffekt and Tretyakov’s
ostranenie are not identical.  The latter is essentially a
formalist device of making things strange through the use of
juxtaposition.  The former involves “laying bare society’s
causal network.”[50]  Thus, while ostranenie is mainly focused
toward disrupting the frozen patterns of sensory perception,
Brecht’s Verfremdungseffekt is instrumentally bound to a
rational explanation of the social processes to be revealed.[51]
 Peter Brooker described this difference by saying that
“Brecht’s conception and use of Verfremdung...entailed a
degree of political insight which thoroughly radicalized the
formalist device of ‘making strange’.”[52]
Benjamin never mentioned this discrepancy when he discussed
Brecht’s work.  Just as in their private conversations and
letters, his texts about him were flattering and accepting. 
Most of his intellectual production, however, remained alien to
the playwright’s militant logic. While Brecht was an overt
Marxist and his dramatic theory was intimately tied to a
socialist transformation, Benjamin’s commitment to dialectical
materialism was much more irresolute.  In fact, it was not the
hope for a proletarian revolution but a rejection of bourgeois
society and, of course, fascism, that attracted him to Marxist
thought.  And although he was thorough in his study of Marx
and his use of dialectic materialism as a “posture,” he never, in
Lunn’s words, “played at being a proletarian or oriented his
work directly toward the working class.”[53]  Moreover, he did
not abandon his Jewish intellectual heritage, tied to a utopian
longing for the coming of a Messiah “who would redeem the
past while inaugurating a secular kingdom of happiness.”[54]
 In short, he showed great ambivalence toward the passing of
tradition.
The differences between Brecht and Benjamin with regard to
the politicization of art are difficult to discern in texts like “The
Author as Producer” and “The Work of Art in the Era of
Mechanical Reproduction.”  However, when we read Benjamin’s
essays on Baudelaire (“The Paris of the Second Empire in
Baudelaire” and “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire”), Benjamin’s
nostalgia toward the decay of aura is made evident and the
very concept of shock acquires a new inflection.  Although in
this second body of writings, ambivalence remains a persistent
feature.
“On Some Motifs in Baudelaire” is often presented as the
major critical statement of Benjamin’s maturity.  The text
begins with a distinction of Erfahrung (ongoing experience or
experience in the sense of learning from life over an extended
period) from Erlebnis (mere experience or a single noteworthy
experience).[55]  Benjamin made a critique of the irrationalist
“Erlebnis cult” of “vitalism” by suggesting that “experience is a
matter of tradition, in collective existence as well as private
life.”  Nevertheless, Erfahrung “is less the product of facts
firmly anchored in memory than of a convergence in memory
of accumulated and frequently unconscious data (mémoire
involontaire).”[56]
For Benjamin, “Baudelaire has placed the shock experience at
the center of his artistic work.”[57]  The poet speaks of men
“absorbing” collisions and shocks as they move through the
traffic of the big city and clash with the amorphous crowd of
passers-by.  “At dangerous intersections, nervous impulses
flow through [them] in rapid succession,” pedestrians have to
stare in all directions “in order to keep abreast of traffic
signals.”[58]  The shock the passer-by experiences in the
crowd corresponds to the worker’s alienating experience with
the machine (as Erlebnis).[59]  It reduces the passer-by to the
state of an automaton.  He becomes alien to Erfahrung.
 Further, wrote Benjamin, “pedestrians act as if they had
adapted themselves to the machines and could express
themselves only automatically.  Their behavior is a reaction to
shocks.”[60]  The worker and the pedestrian seem to have
completely liquidated their memories.
Benjamin proceeded to describe how, in Fleurs du mal, the
withering of the aura is felt each time that Baudelaire refers to
the act of looking.  “Looking at someone carries the implicit
expectation that our look will be returned” and, when this
expectation is met, “there is an experience of the aura to the
fullest extent.”[61]  In Baudelaire, however, this expectation is
never fulfilled, for he describes eyes that are incapable of
looking.  Thus, “On Some Motifs” ends when the poet  has
been thrown into the crowd and tries to escape from it “with
the impotent rage of someone fighting the rain or the wind.”
This frantic image indicated for Benjamin “the price for which
the sensation of the modern may be had: the disintegration of
the aura in the experience of shock.”[62]
As we read this essay, the perception of Benjamin as the one
who celebrates the decay of the aura is shattered.  The
analogy between the alienated worker and the passer-by
questions the liberating capacity of the shock experience. The
constant bombardment of perception in the era of mass
communication does not appear to be creating revolutionary
subjects but beings that are incapable of looking.  Erlebnis
increasingly replaces Erfahrung.  Benjamin writes a
lamentation on the decay of auratic aesthetics and portrays
the modern city as terrifying.  In response to this text, which
Adorno received with great enthusiasm, he commented that
the new usage of the notion of “aura” meant the alienation of
humanly constructed objects from their creators.  Further, it
described a process of reification that occurs as objects lose
their “human trace.”[63]
5. Concluding remarks
As has been widely discussed and memorialized, Benjamin
committed suicide in the Spanish border town of Port Bou on
September 27, 1940, while trying to flee from Nazi
persecution.  He had not been allowed to cross the border and
feared that he would be handed over to the Gestapo the
following day.[64]  When Brecht received the sad news, he
wrote of his friend:
In the end driven to an impassable frontier
You, we hear, passed over a passable one.[65]
With the passing of this border, the relationship between
Benjamin and Brecht became less and less distinct for
scholars, and the critic began to be related more strongly to
the Frankfurt School than to the playwright.  This was partly a
result of the course that followed the posthumous publication
of Benjamin’s writings.  His last completed work that we know
of is the “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” written only
some months before his death.  According to Rolf
Wiggershaus, Adorno considered that “none of Benjamin’s
works showed him closer to [the Institute’s] intentions.”  It
was originally planned to publish a mimeographed booklet
containing the “Theses” with contributions by Horkheimer,
Adorno, and Brecht.  The memorial volume arrived in 1942
but, as Wiggershaus points out, “it was ... decided to do
without Brecht after all.”[66]  In contrast, Understanding
Brecht, a compilation of Benjamin’s writings on Brecht, was
only published in 1966 and translated into English a decade
after.
Benjamin and Brecht shared the intellectual project of
disrupting frozen patterns of perception in order to forge a
new, more critical attitude toward social reality.  Both thinkers
saw shock as a means of shattering the conformist, blinded
man who lives in a state of alienation, and make him so
uncomfortably “strange” that his curiosity may be aroused.
 Furthermore, Benjamin celebrated the playwright’s use of
Verfremdungseffekt, as a mechanism that liberates events
from the “enslaving” narrative of historical inevitability, and
introduced techniques of montage and interruption to his own
writing.  Brecht was therefore crucial for the development of
Benjamin’s aesthetic theory of shock, despite the fact that this
influence has not received sufficient attention.  Nevertheless,
Benjamin’s treatment of shock goes well beyond Brecht’s
optimism.  While Brecht embraced shock with absolute
conviction, for Benjamin it entails great dangers:  the likely
emergence of a mass of “traumatized automatons;”[67] the
vanishing of private space; the coming of an era where
experience, devoid of tradition, is incapable of finding
meaning. 
We should not be surprised by the contradictory treatment of
“shock” in Benjamin’s writings, nor should we attempt to
create a homogeneous whole out of his fragmented
imagination.  He acknowledged his tendency to oscillate
between extreme and apparently irreconcilable positions and,
rather than feeling concerned about it, he saw this wavering as
a means of expanding his own freedom. Indeed, Benjamin’s
ambivalence toward the modernist use of shock gives his
thinking about this concept a richness and complexity that is
rarely acknowledged.
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